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        I. Introduction 
 
Three decades of economic reform have brought tremendous changes in every sector of the 
Chinese economy. The labor market is no exception, and it was particularly affected by 
important policy and institutional changes at the turn of the century. On the one hand, the 
state-sector reform was accelerated after the Chinese Communist Party’s September 1997 
Fifteenth National Congress, which encouraged both the corporatization of large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the restructuring of small SOEs. On the other hand, the Congress also 
recognized private enterprises as an important component of the economy and placed an 
emphasis on rule of law. As a direct consequence, the urban labor market was reshaped due to 
the unprecedented growth in unemployment and the reallocation of labor from the public to 
the private sector. At the same time, competition among workers in the urban labor market 
increased sharply due to the massive rural labor-force exodus, which led to an estimated 140 
million rural workers in the cities by 2008. 
In the context of a transitional economy, these dramatic changes raise a number of issues 
about the direction of the urban labor market. A key aspect to be explored is whether the labor 
market has become market-oriented and whether enterprises with different ownerships 
operate competitively. Academic research using data collected from the mid-1990s to the 
early twenty-first century highlights the incompleteness of the reforms and the “unfinished 
economic revolution” (Lardy 1998), as well as the remaining rigidities in a segmented labor 
market with distinct rules for wage determination and limited labor mobility between 
segments (e.g., Chen, Démurger, and Fournier 2005; Démurger et al. 2006; Dong and Bowles 
2002; Knight and Song 2003; Wang 2005). Evidence from mid-1990s micro data shows that 
workers in the public sector had very few incentives to move and one of the main reasons for 
this immobility was the higher-than-market-clearing-level earnings premium provided to 
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workers in state-owned units (Chen, Démurger, and Fournier 2005; Zhao 2002). Moreover, 
for the period from 1995 to 2002 Démurger et al. (2006) find strong evidence of increasing 
segmentation across ownership, with the gap between the privileged segments of the labor 
market and the most competitive segments widening over time.  
Policy-related rationales for studying labor-market segmentation issues are related to 
both efficiency, as illustrated in the literature on the public-private sector earnings gap in 
developing countries or economies in transition (Adamchik and Bedi 2000; Boeri and Terrell 
2002; Falaris 2004; Lokshin and Jovanovic 2003) and income inequalities (Meng and Zhang 
2001). A multi-tiered labor market in which wages are not only determined by skill 
differentials, but also by different institutional arrangements may have strong implications in 
terms of both labor allocation across sectors and income distribution among workers. In 
China, where the so-called iron rice bowl (tiefanwan) of life-time employment and the 
associated welfare state dominated for years before it was completely dismantled in 1994 
(Knight and Song 2005), the issue of public-sector efficiency appears to have special 
importance. Moreover, the question of income distribution is essential to any government 
concerned about smooth economic development and social safety. With the growth of the 
Chinese economy and rising average wages, the earnings gap triggered vigorous debate. In 
this context, ownership is also a fairly important issue since it is linked to whether the 
government can provide an equal and efficient business environment for all sorts of 
companies to develop and maximize social welfare. Given that the number of enterprises in 
the public sector decreased from about 99 percent of all companies in 1978 to merely 10 
percent in 2007, it is also interesting to explore whether the remaining public-sector 
enterprises still enjoy a privileged position in the labor market due to specific government 
policies. 
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Macroeconomic data on the average wages of staff and workers in urban China show 
an increasing trend since the mid-1990s (Figure 9.1). The average wage in 2007 was 2,060 
yuan per month, 5.7 times higher than the average wage in 1995 (in constant 2007 prices). 
Although the increase was rapid for every type of ownership, some discrepancies emerged 
over time, the most remarkable being a narrowing gap between the public and private sectors. 
Indeed, whereas average wages in 1995 were the highest in the “other ownership” (private 
sector) category, they were lower than those in the SOEs in 2007. Similarly, Peking 
University’s College Students Employment Survey of more than 100 universities in 2002 and 
2007 shows that whereas the first employment intention of students in 2002 was to work in 
foreign-invested enterprises, in 2007 it was the SOE sector. This change calls for further 
research to investigate whether this was due to any discriminatory behavior or to specific 
powers of certain types of enterprises. 
<Insert Figure 9.1 about here> 
The 2008 release of 2007 data from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) project 
makes it possible to analyze whether China’s labor market is still segmented by ownership in 
terms of earnings differentials. The comprehensive information on personal characteristics 
provided by the available micro datasets enables us to investigate wage compensation by 
controlling for the individuals’ most important characteristics. Previous research on China’s 
labor-market segmentation utilized data for 2002 or earlier. However, during the 2002-7 
period, China’s economic growth averaged 10.8 percent in real terms and China became 
increasingly integrated into global markets, especially after joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. In addition, private companies that were allowed to enter the 
previously state-controlled areas, such as steel, aluminum, and automobiles, have been 
immensely successful and many have gone public and become among the top 500 companies 
in China. This implies that old-style companies like state-owned enterprises and urban 
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collective companies have to compete much more intensively with market-oriented 
companies, including private companies, joint-venture companies, and foreign companies.  
Against the backdrop of the accelerating economic reforms between 2002 and 2007, we 
propose to investigate the trends and determinants of the earnings gap across ownership types 
during this period. We first analyze the average gaps by using the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition technique. We then account for the different patterns in the various percentiles 
for different ownership types by applying the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section II describes the 
development of various types of enterprises in China. Section III introduces the dataset and 
some descriptive statistics. Section IV discusses the econometric results of the earnings 
equations by enterprise ownership. Section V and Section VI describe the decomposition 
results of the earnings gaps across ownership types during the 2002-7 period. Section VII 
presents our conclusions. 
 
II. Economic Reforms and the Evolution of Ownership 
After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the means of production were 
gradually transferred to the state, and by 1956 private and individual economic activities had 
become illegal (Naughton 2007). In urban China, within the period of the First Five-Year Plan, 
the share of public ownership increased from 21.3 percent in 1952 to 92.9 percent in 1956 in 
urban China (Su 1999). When the economic reforms began in 1978, the national economy 
was strongly dominated by public ownership, which consisted of state-owned and collective 
enterprises. State-owned and collective (including township-village enterprises [TVEs]) 
enterprises accounted for 24 percent and 76 percent respectively of the total number of 
industrial companies (Su 1999), and produced 77 percent and 23 percent of the total industrial 
output (Naughton 2007). 
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One major feature of the economic reforms was to encourage the development of the 
non-state sector of the economy while reforming the organization of state-owned enterprises. 
By introducing a series of laws and regulations, the government gradually allowed private and 
foreign companies to co-exist with state-owned and collective companies. In 1988, the State 
Council issued the “Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises” to govern the registration 
and management of private firms, and in 1993, the Company Law was promulgated to 
provide a legal framework for the development of limited liability companies and 
shareholding companies (Démurger et al. 2006). Hence, various forms of non-public 
ownership, such as privately owned, foreign-invested, joint-venture, share-holding, stock, and 
self-employed companies, became alternatives to the state-owned companies. More recently, 
efforts have been made to ensure fairer competition between the public and the private sectors 
and to open more industries to the private sector. In 2003, new regulations allowed non-state 
enterprises to enter the steel, aluminum, and even some parts of the national defense 
industries. In February 2005, the State Council issued its “Thirty-six Suggestions to 
Encourage and Support Non-State-Owned Economic Development” in order to reduce the 
barriers to market entry and to stimulate private investment. 
In addition to helping promote competition among companies, the development of the 
non-state sector helped allocate resources more efficiently. Before the reforms, because 
resources were allocated according to the plan and the economy was dominated by public 
ownership, there was no competition among enterprises or employees. Allowing private and 
foreign companies to enter the labor market led to improvements in the national economy as a 
whole and consequently to the promotion of prosperity. The other advantage of allowing the 
existence of private and foreign companies was the alleviation of employment pressures. With 
the baby boom and soldiers transferred to non-military sectors, the labor force grew by more 
than 10 million per year and the non-state sector became a major channel to absorb the new 
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labor force.  
Hence, whereas employment in the public sector rose continuously until the mid-1990s, it 
began to decrease in 1995, with a huge deceleration in 1998 (-18 percent), the pivotal year in 
the SOEs reforms. Since then, the number of workers in SOEs and urban collective 
enterprises (UCEs) decreased from 144.6 million in 1995 to 71.4 million in 2007 (NBS 2008), 
a total decrease of 50 percent. As a consequence, the public-sector share of urban employment 
dropped from 76 percent to 24 percent during the period (Naughton 2007). In contrast to the 
downsizing of the public sector, the private-sector share of urban employment increased from 
16 percent in 1995 to 42 percent in 2007. The remaining 34 percent in 2007 was made of 
“other” employment, which “picks up most of the migrants and unregistered businesses” 
(Naughton 2007, p. 190). The dramatic increase in the private-sector share of urban 
employment can be attributed to the development of both private or individual enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises beginning in the mid-1990s, as well as to the emergence of new 
forms of ownership, including limited liability corporations and share-holding corporations. 
From 1995 to 2007, employment in foreign-invested enterprises tripled (from 5.1 million to 
25.8 million) and employment in private and individual enterprises almost quadrupled (from 
20.4 million to 78.9 million). Moreover, the number of people employed in the new 
ownership forms increased tenfold, from 3.2 million in 1995 to 30.8 million in 2007. These 
figures clearly indicate a significant shift in the employment structure by the turn of the 
century as China experienced a situation somewhat similar to that in the Eastern European 
countries when the labor force moved from the public to the private sector. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
A. Summary Statistics by Ownership 
The data used in this chapter come from two sources: the CHIP, carried out in 2003 for the 
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year 2002, and the CHIP carried out in 2008 for the year 2007. For both surveys, the 
questionnaire was designed by Chinese and foreign researchers and implemented by China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).1 The two datasets include three separate surveys: urban, 
rural, and migrant. In this analysis, we employ the urban survey that covers only urban 
residents.2  The 2002 CHIP urban survey was collected from a population of 20,632, with 
6,835 households in twelve provinces, and the 2007 CHIP urban survey was collected from a 
population of 14,699, with 5,003 households in nine provinces. 
For the sake of comparison, we keep in our sample only observations of the jointly 
surveyed seven provinces. The seven provinces are Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, 
Guangdong, Chongqing, and Sichuan. In addition, we further restrict the sample to 
individuals between the ages of 16 and 60 for men and between the ages of 16 and 55 for 
women who were earning positive wages with full-time employment.3 The final sample size 
totaled 5,430 workers in 2002 and 5,029 workers in 2007. 
Enterprise ownership analyzed in the chapter is divided into five categories (see Table 
9.1): state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government agencies or institutions (GAIs), urban 
collective enterprises (UCEs), private or individual enterprises (PIEs), and foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs). A comparison between 2002 and 2007 shows opposite trends in the public 
and the private sectors: the share of SOEs decreased from 35 percent to 19 percent, whereas 
the share of PIEs increased from 24 percent to 33 percent (Table 9.2). This raises the issue of 
how to classify enterprises according to ownership. In each survey, respondents were required 
to provide the ownership of their company. In the 2002 CHIP survey, the ownership was 
divided into thirteen types, and in 2007 it was divided into sixteen types. In order to simplify 
the analysis, we reduce these different types to five categories. The “SOE” category thus 
contains state-owned enterprises, state-controlled enterprises, and state-owned joint ventures. 
In other words, as long as the state share is dominant, no matter who owns the other shares 
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(whether foreigners or private Chinese investors), in our analysis the enterprise will still fall 
into the SOEs category. However, we classify the solely foreign-invested companies and 
foreign-owned joint-venture companies as FIEs. This classification choice may explain why, 
despite the substantial increase in foreign direct investment from 2002 to 2007, the share of 
FIEs in our analysis does not change significantly.  
< Insert Table 9.1 about here > 
< Insert Table 9.2 about here> 
Descriptive statistics on the individual characteristics of different ownerships are shown 
in Table 9.2. The gender distribution does not change much across years, with males 
representing 56-57 percent of the urban workers and concentrated particularly in SOEs where 
they account for 59.5 percent and 61.5 percent of the total in 2002 and 2007 respectively. To 
some extent, this distribution suggests that males may enjoy some recruitment and income 
from the public sector. Yet a noteworthy change between 2002 and 2007 occurred in the 
UCEs where females were traditionally over-represented (Démurger, Chen, and Fournier 
2007; Maurer-Fazio, Rawski, and Zhang 1999). In 2007, males accounted for 53.7 percent of 
workers in UCEs, against only 44 percent in 2002. Although it still was the lowest share of 
males across ownership, the difference was not significantly different from the other 
categories (with the exception of the SOEs). As documented further below, this change 
reflects the improving situation of the UCEs, where increased competition may have boosted 
productivity and attracted more talented workers. 
A comparison between 2002 and 2007 shows a slight decrease in the average age of the 
workforce, but it was more marked in the UCEs and in the private sector than in the public 
sector (SOEs and GAIs). In both years, the public sector employed more older workers than 
the private sector. As expected, with the expansion of higher education after 1999, the average 
educational attainment of the workforce, measured in years of schooling, substantially 
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increased over time, by almost one year during our 5-year period (from 11.34 years to 12.22 
years). Except for the GAIs, which employed the most-educated workers in 2002,4 each 
ownership category benefited from the increase in the education level so that the absolute gap 
in the educational attainment of workers across ownership declined from 2.56 years to 2.09 
years. This evolution indicates that in addition to public administration, FIEs were 
increasingly able to attract talented youth in 2007. 
The average experience in the current job (expressed in years) was much shorter in 2007 
than in 2002 for all the sectors except the GAIs. The sharpest decreases occurred in the 
semi-public sector (UCEs) and the private sector (both PIEs and FIEs). This evolution 
probably signals increased job mobility in these sectors, whereas jobs in the public sector 
(SOEs and GAIs) were still the most stable and hence individuals did not readily leave their 
positions there. Finally, the average size of companies experienced a decreasing trend 
between 2002 and 2007, with the SOEs and FIEs among the largest enterprises. 
 
B. The Evolution of Earnings and their Distribution by Ownership 
Table 9.3 reports the summary statistics on earnings by ownership. Total annual earnings are 
composed of reported wages, bonuses, in-kind earnings, subsidies, pension income, and so 
forth. Hourly earnings are calculated by dividing the total annual earnings by the number of 
declared hours worked in a year. In addition, earnings are adjusted for provincial purchasing 
power differences by using an updated set of the Brandt and Holz (2006) urban 
provincial-level spatial price deflators in order to account for differences in living standards 
across cities. 
< Insert Table 9.3 about here > 
In the five-year period from 2002 to 2007, earnings differentials between enterprises of 
different ownership changed markedly. On average, real earnings almost doubled, but at a 
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different pace across enterprises. The state sector experienced the slowest growth in annual 
and hourly earnings (88-92 percent for the SOEs and 62-63 percent for the GAIs); in contrast, 
both the UCEs and the private sector experienced earnings increases of more than 110 percent 
(up to a maximum of 138 percent for hourly earnings in the UCEs). As opposed to what 
occurred between 1995 and 2002 (Démurger et al. 2006), the differentials across enterprises 
somehow re-adjusted in the direction of more equality due to the dramatic increase in 
earnings in both the UCEs and the PIEs. On the one hand, although total earnings were the 
highest in the GAIs in 2002, the much-slower increase in earnings in the GAIs between 2002 
and 2007 moved them down to the second rank, below the FIEs.5 On the other hand, the 
UCEs as well as the PIEs saw their relative positions improve dramatically (again unlike what 
occurred between 1995 and 2002), and the gap to average total earnings was reduced from 0.7 
to 0.86 for the UCEs and from 0.81 to 0.94 for the PIEs. Last, SOEs stood at the middle and 
the almost doubling of earnings in this part of the state sector allowed workers to maintain 
their intermediate position, with a gap to average earnings very close to one during the two 
years.6 
Another interesting point focuses on the ongoing convergence of working time between 
the public and private sectors. From 1995 to 2002, the number of hours worked per week 
continued to decrease in both PIEs and FIEs. However, in 2007 the working time increased 
slightly in the public sector, although it remained less than that in the private sector. One 
possible reason for this convergence is that the competition in the SOEs and GAIs sectors 
became more intensive and employees had to work harder to maintain their positions. 
Furthermore, the PIEs and FIEs began to pay more attention to employee rights. 
The Gini coefficients highlight a general trend of increasing inequality in annual and 
hourly earnings. For the entire sample, the Gini coefficient for hourly earnings increased from 
0.367 to 0.405 between 2002 and 2007. Although PIEs continuously exhibited the largest 
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earnings dispersion over time,7 the increase in earnings inequality was more pronounced in 
the public sector (including the UCEs), which resulted in a convergence of the earnings 
distributions across sectors between 2002 and 2007.  
Non-parametric kernel density estimations for the distribution of the logarithm of hourly 
earnings by ownership category and by year are presented in Figure 9.2.8 For each year, the 
figure shows the distribution for the entire sample as well as for the ownership category 
subsamples. 
< Insert Figure 9.2 about here > 
The upper panel of Figure 9.2 displays the kernel density estimates for the year 2002. 
Hourly earnings in GAIs on average were higher than those in other sectors, which can be 
seen in both the position of the curve most to the right and the higher kurtosis. In addition, the 
spread is very narrow and highly concentrated around the mean. FIEs came second, with 
average earnings only slightly higher than those in SOEs but with a larger width, thereby 
illustrating a wider distribution. The hourly wages in PIEs were the lowest among the five 
sectors, with the distribution skewed to the right, indicating that some earnings in PIEs were 
fairly low. 
As illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 9.2, the patterns did not change much over 
time, except that the five lines seem closer in 2007 than they were in 2002. This further 
illustrates the converging trend of the hourly earnings gap among the five sectors. In 2007 the 
FIEs exhibit better hourly wage distributions than the GAIs. Together with the higher average 
hourly earnings, FIEs also exhibit a very flat tail in the left part of the distribution, indicating 
that there were not many low-wage earners in this sector.9 Moreover, the distributions for the 
GAIs and UCEs are quite similar, except that the hourly wage distribution of the GAIs is on 
the right of the hourly wage distribution of the UCEs. Finally, the kurtosis is the highest in the 
SOEs, suggesting a sharper peak and fatter tails for the hourly earnings distribution in the 
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state sector.  
 
IV. The Determinants of Hourly Earnings 
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 present OLS estimations of an augmented Mincerian hourly earnings 
function (Mincer 1974) run separately by enterprise ownership and by year.10 The Mincerian 
earnings equation takes the following form: 
iriririr uXw += β                 (1) 
where subscript r∈[1, 5] represents the five different ownership categories defined above. wir 
is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings (adjusted for provincial purchasing power 
differences) for individual i in enterprise r. Xir is a vector of her individual characteristics and 
β gives the set of returns to each observed socio-demographic characteristic. X includes 
gender, education (measured in years of schooling, as reported in the surveys), work 
experience11 and its square, work experience in the current occupation, on-the-job training 
(dummy variable), regional dummies for coastal provinces and for capital cities, and company 
size. The residual uir stands for all the unobservable factors that may affect individual hourly 
earnings w.  
< Insert Table 9.4 about here> 
< Insert Table 9.5 about here > 
Returns to education are significant in all sectors for both years. They are much higher in 
GAIs and FIEs than in any other sector. A comparison over time reveals interesting changes. 
Indeed, returns to education exhibit an increasing trend in UCEs, FIEs, and GAIs between 
2002 and 2007, but a decreasing trend in both SOEs and PIEs, resulting in a growing gap 
across sectors. Hence, the range of returns to education depending on enterprise ownership 
moved from 5.64 percent to 8.57 percent in 2002 to 3.81 percent to 9.04 percent in 2007.  
Linear and quadratic terms in experience are significant in the public sector (SOEs and 
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GAIs) as well as in the private sector (PIEs), but not significant in UCEs and FIEs in either 
2002 and 2007. As discussed in Chen, Démurger, and Fournier (2005), the observed 
difference in experience earnings profiles between the public sector and the other sectors 
suggests that in SOEs and GAIs seniority remains an important component in the 
determination of wages. Interestingly, however, experience is also important in the private 
sector. A comparison between 2002 and 2007 shows much earlier earnings peaks in 2007, 
suggesting that older people saw their relative position deteriorating over time. Indeed, 
whatever the enterprise, in 2007 the experience profile began to decrease after twenty years of 
experience, whereas in 2002 it decreased after thirty years of experience. The introduction of 
another experience indicator that measures the number of years in the company adds some 
interesting results for the foreign-invested firms. Indeed, the associated coefficient turns out to 
be significant in 2007, suggesting that the experience that counts for FIEs is experience 
accumulated in the enterprise rather than overall experience (which may have also been 
accumulated in the less efficient public or semi-public sectors).  
Returns to gender also exhibit noteworthy differences across ownership and over time. In 
2002, being a male in a PIE increased log hourly wages by about 21.9 percent, whereas the 
increase was only 7 percent in GAIs. The “male premium” increased dramatically over time, 
especially in the public and the semi-public sectors, and reached levels between 16.5 percent 
(in GAIs) and 25 percent (in PIEs). This partly reflects findings by Li and Song (2010) that 
show that gender wage inequality increased during the 2002-7 period. Interestingly, FIEs do 
not appear to favor males over females since the coefficient for the gender dummy is never 
significant.  
Finally, the coefficient estimates for being located in a coastal province (Beijing, Jiangsu, 
or Guangdong) show a premium for living along the coast in all enterprises except the FIEs in 
both years. A comparison of the coefficients over time suggests an increasing “coastal 
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premium” for the SOEs and UCEs, and a slightly decreasing premium for the PIEs. 
 
V. Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions 
In order to analyze the earnings differentials between individuals belonging to different 
enterprises, we first use the Oaxaca-Blinder method (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) to 
decompose the mean differences in log earnings into two components: one attributable to the 
differences in the mean endowments of workers across ownership, and one attributable to the 
differences in returns to these endowments.  
The observed difference in average log earnings between two enterprises of different 
ownership, r1 and r2, can be defined as: 
2121 rrrr www −=Δ                 (2) 
where the bars indicate the mean values. Substituting Equation (1) for Equation (2) yields: 
221121
ˆˆ ''
rrrrrr XXw ββ −=Δ               (3) 
where the hats denote the estimated coefficients from the separate earnings equations.  
Assuming that a non-discriminatory wage structure β* is known, the log wage differential 
can be decomposed in the following way (Neumark 1988): 
)]ˆ()ˆ([)'( *'*'*
22112121
βββββ −−−+−=Δ rrrrrrrr XXXXw        (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the earnings gap between ownership r1 and ownership r2 can be 
decomposed into two parts. The first term can be interpreted as the part of the log earnings 
differential due to differences in average individual characteristics between different 
ownerships. This measures how much individuals in ownership r1 would earn if they had the 
same characteristics as those in ownership r2. The second term represents the amount by 
which earnings in two different ownerships differ from the assumed non-discriminatory wage 
structure. It is the “unexplained” or residual component of the earnings gap. This effect may be 
due to either segmentation or to different productivity levels. In other words, the fact that 
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individuals with the same characteristics are paid differently in firms of different ownership 
might be due to different production processes that result in a different individual productivity 
across ownership, or to particular institutional factors, such as monopolistic power that leads 
to the return gap. There are several ways of constructing the assumed non-discriminatory wage 
structure β* (Jann 2008). In the following, we present decompositions using the method 
proposed by Neumark (1988), which assumes a pooled wage structure (including a group 
indicator as suggested by Jann [2008]) as the non-discriminatory wage structure. 
Table 9.6 reports the changes in relative remuneration across enterprises of different 
ownership in urban China by applying the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method separately 
for 2002 and for 2007. The table presents the mean predictions by ownership group, their 
difference, and the decomposition of the difference into explained and unexplained parts 
(expressed in both mean value and in percentage of the mean difference).  
< Insert Table 9.6 about here > 
The top panel in Table 9.6 shows the log hourly earnings decomposition results by 
ownership for 2002. The earnings gaps are rather large, especially between the public sector 
and the PIEs, as well as between the FIEs and the PIEs. In addition, except for the gap 
between the SOEs and the FIEs, all ownership differences are significantly different from 
zero. The results of the decomposition reveal that differences in endowment account for a 
rather small share of the earnings gap for all pairs of sectors, except for the UCE-PIE and 
PIE-FIE pairs. Hence, in 2002 the unexplained part accounted for most of the observed 
difference, thereby corroborating the findings by Démurger et al. (2006) that show the 
segmentation effect across ownership is fairly serious in urban China. The most striking 
example of such segmentation can be observed within the public sector: differences in 
endowments between SOEs and GAIs are negligible and the 27 percent earnings gap is 
entirely due to the “unexplained” component, which probably reflects the very strong 
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institutional protection of workers in GAIs at the turn of the century (Démurger et al. 2006). 
The same applies between the GAIs and FIEs, the former clearly appearing to be a protected 
sector as compared to the foreign sector. 
Compared to 2002, the log hourly earnings gaps across ownership in 2007 were 
substantially reduced for all pairs of sectors, except for between SOEs and FIEs and for 
between GAIs and FIEs, for which the gap turned significantly in favor of FIEs. The 
evolution was generally in favor of both the private and semi-public sectors (PIEs, FIEs, and 
UCEs), and at the expense of the public sector, mostly the GAIs that had gained substantially 
during the 1995-2002 period. As already observed in the descriptive part of this chapter, the 
trend during the 2002-7 period was toward a rebalancing between the different ownerships.  
The pattern of decomposition across ownership also changed remarkably between 2002 
and 2007, with a striking reversal in the contributions of the explained and unexplained parts 
in the earnings differentials. Differences in endowment gained importance in accounting for 
the earnings gaps in 2007 as well as for the general decreasing trend in the earnings 
differences across ownership, whereas segmentation began to be less important.  
The decomposition analysis presented in Table 9.6 highlights three main phenomena on 
the ownership dimension that are important to understand the recent evolution of the labor 
market in urban China. First, urban collectives and private enterprises, as compared to the 
public sector, saw their relative position improve dramatically. Indeed, compared to both 
SOEs and GAIs, the huge decrease in the earnings gap came from two concomitant forces: a 
convergence in endowments on the one hand, and a sharp reduction of segmentation against 
UCEs and PIEs on the other. This change is important in the sense that it signals an 
unprecedented better integration of the domestic sectors -- public, semi-public, and private.  
Second, although the dominant position of GAIs declined between 2002 and 2007, the 
still comparatively higher wages in GAIs may be attributed to the employees’ better 
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endowments as compared to those in other sectors. This is especially the case when compared 
to UCEs and PIEs: differences in endowments account for 50 percent and 67 percent of the 
earnings gap with GAIs in 2007, whereas these shares were only 12 percent and 28 percent 
respectively in 2002. That is, the strong increase in segmentation in favor of GAIs that was 
observed in the early 2000s (Démurger et al. 2006) vanished in the more recent period, both 
in absolute terms and as a share of the log earnings differences, which may indicate a trend 
toward less protection of earnings in the public sector. 
Third, the foreign sector continued to reinforce its position through both better 
characteristics and more pronounced segmentation, especially compared to the public sector. 
Interestingly, the sharp increase in the earnings gap between SOEs and FIEs (in favor of the 
latter) between 2002 and 2007 was due to both diverging characteristics (that explain almost 
half the gap in 2007) and increasing segmentation. In 2007, if there were no differences in 
characteristics between SOEs and FIEs, the premium for FIEs would be 13 percent. A 
premium of a similar magnitude due to the “unexplained” part applies to the difference with 
GAIs, which explains the entire gap since the characteristics of workers in FIEs and GAIs are 
very similar. Finally, compared with UCEs and PIEs, the position of FIEs did not change 
considerably: both the better characteristics in FIEs and the rather strong segmentation 
contributed almost equally to the still important earnings gaps of 37 percent with UCEs and 
47 percent with PIEs. 
 
VI. Juhn-Murphy-Pierce Decomposition 
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach deals only with the mean of the distribution and 
it ignores differences along the distribution, for instance its dispersion or skewness. However, 
as shown in Section III, the distribution of hourly earnings differs across sectors. Hence, to 
complement the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we use the decomposition technique 
 577
proposed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) that takes into account the entire earnings 
distribution.  
The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method extends the Oaxaca-Blinder approach by 
accounting for the residual distribution so that the hourly earnings gap can be decomposed 
into three parts: the individual characteristics effect (resulting from a change in the 
distribution of the Xs), the return or “price” effect (resulting from a change in the βs), and the 
residual effect (or the influence of the unobservable factors).  
Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), the residual uir in Equation (1) can be 
written as follows:  
)(1 irirrir XFu θ−=                    (5) 
where θir is the percentile of an individual in the residual distribution, and Fr is the cumulative 
distribution function of the earnings equation residuals (for individuals with characteristics Xir 
in ownership r).  
 Assuming that F* is a reference residual distribution and β* is a reference wage structure,12 
two hypothetical hourly earnings distributions can be created as follows: 
)(
1111
1**1
iriririr XFXw θβ −+=              (6) 
)(
111
1
1
1*2
iririr
r
ir XFXw θβ −+=              (7) 
The first hypothetical set of wages given in Equation (6) is computed by valuing each 
worker’s characteristics 
1irX  in sector r1 at the reference wage structure β
* and her position in 
sector r1’s residual distribution at the corresponding position in the reference residual 
distribution F*. The second hypothetical distribution for sector r1 given in Equation (7) results 
from giving each worker her own estimated returns to characteristics 1rβ  but the reference 
residual distribution F*. 
A main feature of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition approach is that it allows for 
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an analysis over the entire earnings distribution. If the notation w~  indicates a summary 
statistic of the distribution of the corresponding variable, one can then write the following 
decomposition of the log earnings difference between two enterprises of different ownership, 
r1 and r2: 
)]~~()~~[()]~~()~~[(~~~~ 22112211
212121212121 rrrrrrrrrrrr wwwwwwwwwwww −−−+−−−+−=−   (8) 
Given the definitions above, the first right-hand side term simply reflects the individual 
characteristics effect, or the difference in observable quantities between the two sectors. The 
second term (in brackets) represents the return effect, or the difference in observable prices, 
and the third term represents the residual effect, expressed by the difference of the two 
sectors’ residual distribution. 
< Insert Figure 9.3 about here > 
The results of Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions for each ownership pair are displayed 
in Figure 9.3. Each subfigure presents the earnings gap as well as its decomposition for an 
ownership pair at various percentiles: 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th. Four main 
observations can be drawn from these figures. 
First, the distribution of the earnings gaps varies markedly across ownership pairs. A 
comparison of any ownership with the domestic private sector (that is, the following pairs: 
SOEs-PIEs, GAIs-PIEs, UCEs-PIEs, and FIEs-PIES) shows that the largest gap occurs at the 
bottom of the distribution but it almost vanishes at the top of the distribution in both 2002 and 
2007. This means that the significant average earnings gaps observed between these 
categories of ownership are mainly due to individuals in the bottom 5-10 percentile, with the 
private sector paying much less than any other category. However, the pattern is completely 
reversed when comparing UCEs and FIEs in 2002: the earnings gap for the lowest 
wage-earners is fairly small but it increases significantly when moving up the income 
distribution. This trend reflects the patterns observed in Figure 9.2, with “high-wage” earners 
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in the foreign sector receiving much higher remuneration than “high-wage” earners in the 
semi-public sector in 2002. Finally, the profile for the earning gaps between SOEs and UCEs, 
between GAIs and UCEs, as well as between SOEs and GAIs is rather flat in 2002. This 
indicates comparatively fairly equal distributions of the earnings gaps in the public and 
semi-public sectors, as the difference between the top and bottom percentiles is not 
substantial.  
Second, the decomposition of the earnings gaps confirms that individual endowments 
explain only a small share of the observed gaps within the public and semi-public sectors 
(SOEs, GAIs, and UCEs), whereas the segmentation (or price) effect is the largest, with no 
significant variations across the distribution. When compared with the private sector, the 
quantity component becomes relatively more important, explaining about half the earnings 
difference between FIEs and UCEs and between FIEs and PIEs. Finally, the residual effect 
(unobserved factors) does not play any clear-cut role in explaining the earnings difference, 
except at the bottom of the distribution for the SOE-PIE, GAI-PIE, and UCE-PIE pairs. 
Third, the comparison between SOEs and FIEs merits specific comment because the gap 
varies greatly over the earnings distribution and important changes occurred over time. In 
2002, SOEs were paying comparatively higher average wages to the lowest wage-earners, 
whereas FIEs were offering higher wages to the 75th percentile, thereby changing the sign 
over the distribution (and possibly explaining why the mean difference reported in Table 9.6 
is not significant). Interestingly, although the gap in favor of SOEs at the bottom of the 
distribution appears to be explained equally by differences in quantity, price, and residuals, 
the gap in favor of FIEs at the top of the distribution is mainly explained by different 
remuneration characteristics (that more than compensate for the better characteristics of SOE 
workers).  
Fourth, as previously discussed, earnings differentials were substantially reduced between 
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2002 and 2007 for almost all pairs of sectors. Whole distributions provide a more complete 
view of this average evolution by highlighting some differences along the earnings 
distribution. Hence, the reduction in the earnings gap tends to be more pronounced at the 
bottom of the distribution, due to the decreasing segmentation. This is particularly the case for 
the SOE-GAI and UCE-GAI pairs, suggesting that in the public sector, the wage structure has 
become more harmonized for low wage-earners. In addition, distribution patterns for different 
ownerships at various percentiles changed considerably, suggesting that wage-setting 
mechanisms experienced major changes during this period. In this respect, the foreign sector 
exhibits particularly interesting changes. Indeed, the position of FIEs clearly improved 
relative to both SOEs and GAIs, with the gap in 2007 fully favoring the FIEs over the whole 
distribution, and with very clear differences at the top of the distribution, almost fully 
explained by segmentation in favor of FIEs. This probably reflects a proactive strategy by 
FIEs toward high wage-earners (this was already visible in 2002, although it was less 
clear-cut). Interestingly, the smallest earnings differential for the FIE-SOE and FIE-GAI pairs 
is around the 25th percentile, which indicates that for individuals below the median, wages 
across these ownerships are quite similar. Finally, the 2007 figures also indicate that 
segmentation still played a fairly important role in explaining earnings gaps across ownership, 
with a particularly pronounced importance at the top of the distribution.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes wage inequality trends across ownership during the 2002-7 period and 
investigates the reasons for the gap by decomposing the difference in mean wages using the 
Oaxaca-Blinder technique and analyzing the wage-gap distribution using the 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method. 
We find that although average earnings gaps were still fairly large across ownership 
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sectors in 2002, they decreased by 2007. Moreover, the observed earnings convergence took 
place in favor of the private and semi-public sectors, as opposed to the public sector. In terms 
of earnings differentials across the distribution, the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition 
highlights a comparatively fairly equal distribution within the public sector, whereas most of 
the gap for the private domestic sector came from the bottom of the distribution. As for 
foreign-invested enterprises, the clear improvement in their position with regard to the public 
sector (SOEs and GAIs) between 2002 and 2007 is observable across the entire distribution, 
implying that workers in foreign-invested firms benefited from the improved position of these 
enterprises.  
The Oaxaca-Blinder and Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions both show that differences 
in endowments gained importance over time in accounting for the earnings gaps as well as for 
the generally decreasing trend in earnings differences across ownership. However, 
segmentation was less important in 2007 as compared to 2002. Indeed, our results highlight a 
better integration of the domestic sectors over time. They also show that segmentation in 
favor of GAIs, which was fairly strong in 2002, vanished over time, although not throughout 
the entire distribution. In particular, the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions indicate that 
segmentation remained important for high wage-earners, as compared to workers at the 
bottom of the distribution, suggesting that workers at the top of the distribution were still 
benefiting from some protection.
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Table 9.1. Definition of ownership categories 
 
Public versus 
private groups 
Ownership categories Types included 
Public sector State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) 
Solely state owned enterprises; 
State holding enterprises; 
State holding joint ventures. 
 Government agencies and 
institutions (GAIs) 
Government agencies and Party agencies 
(including the Party Committee, 
Government, People’s Congress, the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), public security 
organs & procurator’s offices & courts, 
the military); 
State and collective institutions; 
Civilian-run enterprises and public service 
units. 
Semi-public sector Urban collective 
enterprises (UCEs) 
Solely collective owned enterprises; 
Collective holding enterprises; 
Collective holding joint ventures. 
Private sector Private and individual 
enterprises (PIEs) 
Solely private owned enterprises; 
Private holding enterprises; 
Private holding joint ventures; 
Self-employed individuals. 
 Foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) 
Solely foreign owned enterprises; 
Foreign holding joint ventures. 
Source: 2007 CHIP urban survey questionnaire.  
Note: If the answer given by the respondent is “Other enterprise,” then it is not attributed to any 
of the above categories and is simply dropped. 
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Table 9.2. Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by ownership 
 
2002 SOEs GAIs UCEs PIEs FIEs All 
Male 0.595 0.551 0.440 0.549 0.567 0.558
 (0.491) (0.498) (0.497) (0.498) (0.497) (0.497) 
Age 40.86 40.46 41.44 39.11 35.85 40.24 
 (8.505) (8.914) (8.178) (8.666) (8.923) (8.716) 
Education 11.17 12.69 10.13 10.14 11.96 11.34 
 (2.702) (2.872) (2.471) (2.853) (2.665) (2.957) 
Experience in 17.71 14.43 16.25 10.45 10.46 14.65 
current job (9.383) (9.214) (9.380) (9.335) (8.417) (9.722) 
Training 0.283 0.327 0.239 0.198 0.276 0.273 
 (0.451) (0.469) (0.427) (0.398) (0.449) (0.445) 
Coast 0.308 0.294 0.450 0.363 0.504 0.332 
 (0.462) (0.456) (0.498) (0.481) (0.502) (0.471) 
Capital city 0.348 0.305 0.232 0.236 0.488 0.302 
 (0.476) (0.461) (0.422) (0.425) (0.502) (0.459) 
Company size 2.912 1.793 1.919 1.752 2.709 2.204 
 (1.129) (1.013) (0.968) (1.069) (1.062) (1.194) 
Observations 1896 1698 393 1316 127 5430
  % of total 34.92 31.27 7.24 24.24 2.34 100.00 
2007 SOEs GAIs UCEs PIEs FIEs All 
Male 0.615 0.570 0.537 0.555 0.558 0.571
 (0.487) (0.495) (0.500) (0.497) (0.498) (0.495) 
Age 40.56 40.59 39.52 37.93 34.17 39.43 
 (9.258) (9.332) (9.118) (9.236) (7.748) (9.353) 
Education 12.14 12.99 11.78 11.30 13.39 12.22 
 (3.032) (3.076) (3.116) (3.232) (3.211) (3.215) 
Experience in 16.99 14.85 12.48 8.606 8.628 12.85 
current job (10.72) (10.63) (10.19) (8.115) (7.126) (10.32) 
Training 0.442 0.425 0.326 0.275 0.407 0.372 
 (0.497) (0.494) (0.470) (0.447) (0.493) (0.484) 
Coast 0.248 0.321 0.389 0.398 0.628 0.347 
 (0.432) (0.467) (0.488) (0.490) (0.485) (0.476) 
Capital city 0.673 0.664 0.646 0.606 0.512 0.640 
 (0.469) (0.473) (0.479) (0.489) (0.501) (0.480) 
Company size 2.531 1.858 1.800 1.358 2.145 1.827 
 (1.208) (1.082) (1.013) (0.783) (1.227) (1.102) 
Observations 949 1968 285 1655 172 5029 
  % of total 18.87 39.13 5.67 32.91 3.42 100.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2002 CHIP and the 2007 CHIP survey data, urban 
sample, 7 provinces, with 16<=age<=60 for men and 16<=age<=55 for women, full-time 
employment, and earning positive wages. 
Note: Ownership categories are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government agencies or 
institutions (GAIs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), private or individual enterprises 
(PIEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). “Male,” “Training,” “Coast,” and “Capital 
city” are dummy variables for being a male, having received training, living in a coastal city, 
and living in a provincial capital city respectively. “Education” measures the number of years 
of education received. “Experience in current job” refers to the number of years in the current 
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occupation. “Company size” measures the number of employees in the company and is 
grouped by 4 ranks (following the 2002 CHIP), 1 represents 1-100 employees; 2 represents 
101-500 employees; 3 represents 501-1000 employees; and 4 represents 1,000 employees or 
more. 
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Table 9.3. Descriptive statistics on individual earnings by ownership 
 
2002 SOEs GAIs UCEs PIEs FIEs All 
Total year income 11261.6 14221.1 8108.8 9270.9 12907.7 11514.9 
 (7352.8) (7992.0) (4880.5) (9157.6) (9617.8) (8211.9) 
Gap to average 
earnings 0,98 1,24 0,70 0,81 1,12  
Gini coefficient 0.307 0.290 0.293 0.386 0.324 0.336 
       
Working hours/week 42.30 41.23 44.38 51.94 45.34 44.52 
 (7.972) (8.060) (10.39) (15.63) (11.61) (11.45) 
       
Hourly wage 5.380 7.086 3.710 3.851 5.877 5.434 
 (4.375) (6.096) (2.444) (4.819) (4.836) (5.155) 
Gap to average 
earnings 0,99 1,30 0,68 0,71 1,08 
 
Gini coefficient 0.334 0.328 0.322 0.430 0.361 0.377 
Observations 1896 1698 393 1316 127 5430 
       
2007 SOEs GAIs UCEs PIEs FIEs All 
Total year income 21614.6 23096.0 18897.0 20492.2 27455.7 21870.7 
 (18204.8) (16235.1
) 
(12956.8
) 
(27264.2) (19755.7
) 
(20872.9
) 
Gap to average 
earnings 0,99 1,06 0,86 0,94 1,26  
Gini coefficient 0.341 0.338 0.337 0.408 0.366 0.367 
2002-7 growth rate 92% 62% 133% 121% 113% 90% 
       
Working hours/week 43.24 42.19 44.65 49.87 42.61 45.07 
 (9.682) (19.21) (10.24) (22.32) (7.716) (18.59) 
       
Hourly wage 10.13 11.58 8.826 8.947 12.81 10.33 
 (9.031) (11.01) (6.914) (11.56) (9.277) (10.68) 
Gap to average 
earnings 0,98 1,12 0,85 0,87 1,24  
Gini coefficient 0.364 0.378 0.375 0.449 0.375 0.405 
2002-7 growth rate 88% 63% 138% 132% 118% 90% 
Observations 949 1968 285 1655 172 5029 
Source: See Table 9.2. 
Notes: Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated 
by Brandt and Holz (2006), and updated for 2007. Base: Nationwide prices in 2002. 
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Table 9.4. Hourly wage functions by ownership, 2002 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SOEs GAIs UCEs PIEs FIEs 
Male 0.104*** 
(0.000) 
0.0700** 
(0.012) 
0.122** 
(0.041) 
0.219*** 
(0.000) 
0.145 
(0.201) 
Education 0.0621*** 
(0.000) 
0.0657*** 
(0.000) 
0.0564*** 
(0.000) 
0.0759*** 
(0.000) 
0.0857*** 
(0.000) 
Experience 0.0370*** 
(0.000) 
0.0422*** 
(0.000) 
0.0226 
(0.116) 
0.0380*** 
(0.000) 
0.0207 
(0.365) 
Experience² -0.000591*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000705***
(0.000) 
-0.000391 
(0.158) 
-0.000631*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000223 
(0.679) 
Experience in 
current job 
0.00316 
(0.147) 
0.0128*** 
(0.000) 
0.00107 
(0.761) 
0.0127*** 
(0.000) 
0.00898 
(0.204) 
Training 0.200*** 
(0.000) 
0.0390 
(0.191) 
0.0914 
(0.164) 
0.0759 
(0.252) 
0.195 
(0.179) 
Coast 0.215*** 
(0.000) 
0.338*** 
(0.000) 
0.161*** 
(0.007) 
0.423*** 
(0.000) 
0.159 
(0.225) 
Capital city 0.200*** 
(0.000) 
0.0362 
(0.225) 
0.314*** 
(0.000) 
0.264*** 
(0.000) 
0.0702 
(0.600) 
Company size 0.0354*** 
(0.003) 
0.0430*** 
(0.001) 
0.0287 
(0.262) 
0.128*** 
(0.000) 
0.116** 
(0.021) 
Constant -0.108 
(0.315) 
-0.00987 
(0.929) 
-0.0149 
(0.949) 
-0.982*** 
(0.000) 
-0.413 
(0.263) 
N 1896 1698 393 1316 127 
R2 0.194 0.256 0.156 0.205 0.219 
Source: See Table 9.2. 
Notes: See Table 9.2. p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by 
Brandt and Holz (2006), and updated for 2007. Base: Nationwide prices in 2002. 
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Table 9.5. Hourly wage functions by ownership, 2007 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SOEs GAIs UCEs PIEs FIEs 
Male 0.195*** 
(0.000) 
0.168*** 
(0.000) 
0.212*** 
(0.005) 
0.250*** 
(0.000) 
0.0771 
(0.407) 
Education 0.0381*** 
(0.000) 
0.0717*** 
(0.000) 
0.0653*** 
(0.000) 
0.0500*** 
(0.000) 
0.0904*** 
(0.000) 
Experience 0.0168** 
(0.047) 
0.0129** 
(0.049) 
-0.00463 
(0.748) 
0.0137** 
(0.031) 
0.0174 
(0.474) 
Experience² -0.000452*** 
(0.009) 
-0.000352**
(0.014) 
-0.00000205
(0.995) 
-0.000458*** 
(0.002) 
-0.000617 
(0.318) 
Experience in 
current job 
0.00788*** 
(0.003) 
0.0214*** 
(0.000) 
0.00599 
(0.187) 
0.0126*** 
(0.000) 
0.0336*** 
(0.000) 
Training 0.197*** 
(0.000) 
0.0478 
(0.119) 
0.118 
(0.152) 
0.100*** 
(0.006) 
0.102 
(0.275) 
Coast 0.341*** 
(0.000) 
0.337*** 
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
0.384*** 
(0.000) 
0.213* 
(0.063) 
Capital city 0.0770* 
(0.079) 
0.0629** 
(0.036) 
0.183** 
(0.017) 
0.184*** 
(0.000) 
-0.129 
(0.206) 
Company size 0.00609 
(0.743) 
0.0359** 
(0.012) 
0.0294 
(0.415) 
0.0433** 
(0.030) 
-0.0482 
(0.201) 
Constant 1.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.540*** 
(0.000) 
0.776** 
(0.011) 
0.650*** 
(0.000) 
0.689 
(0.125) 
N 948 1964 285 1652 172 
R2 0.136 0.243 0.212 0.198 0.336 
Source: See Table 9.2. 
Note: See Table 9.4. 
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Table 9.6. Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of log hourly wages by ownership 
 
Year 2002   
 
Average log 
earnings 
Difference 
(A-B) Decomposition N 
 
Group 
A 
Group 
B  Explained Percentage Unexplained Percentage  
SOEs-GAIs 1.490*** 1.762*** -0.271*** 0.0115 -4.2% -0.283*** 104.2% 3594 
 (0.0141) (0.0154) (0.0209) (0.0150)  (0.0219)   
SOEs-UCEs 1.490*** 1.139*** 0.351*** 0.105*** 29.9% 0.246*** 70.1% 2289 
 (0.0141) (0.0293) (0.0325) (0.0182)  (0.0324)   
SOEs-PIEs 1.490*** 0.973*** 0.517*** 0.256*** 49.5% 0.261*** 50.5% 3212 
 (0.0141) (0.0266) (0.0301) (0.0189)  (0.0274)   
SOEs-FIEs 1.490*** 1.547*** -0.0566 -0.00777 13.7% -0.0488 86.3% 2023 
 (0.0141) (0.0587) (0.0604) (0.0262)  (0.0556)   
GAIs-UCEs 1.762*** 1.139*** 0.622*** 0.0726*** 11.7% 0.550*** 88.3% 2091 
 (0.0154) (0.0293) (0.0331) (0.0200)  (0.0340)   
GAIs-PIEs 1.762*** 0.973*** 0.789*** 0.217*** 27.5% 0.572*** 72.5% 3014 
 (0.0154) (0.0266) (0.0307) (0.0194)  (0.0307)   
GAIs-FIEs 1.762*** 1.547*** 0.215*** 0.0323 15.0% 0.183** 85.0% 1825 
 (0.0154) (0.0587) (0.0607) (0.0308)  (0.0589)   
UCEs-PIEs 1.139*** 0.973*** 0.166*** 0.119*** 71.7% 0.0473 28.3% 1709 
 (0.0293) (0.0266) (0.0396) (0.0242)  (0.0369)   
UCEs-FIEs 1.139*** 1.547*** -0.408*** -0.178*** 43.6% -0.230*** 56.4% 520 
 (0.0293) (0.0588) (0.0657) (0.0428)  (0.0665)   
PIEs-FIEs 0.973*** 1.547*** -0.574*** -0.334*** 58.2% -0.240*** 41.8% 1443 
 (0.0266) (0.0587) (0.0645) (0.0439)  (0.0607)   
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Table 9.6 (cont’). Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of log hourly wages by ownership 
 
Year 2007   
 
Average log 
earnings 
Difference 
(A-B) Decomposition N 
 
Group 
A 
Group 
B  Explained Percentage Unexplained Percentage  
SOEs-GAIs 2.081*** 2.194*** -0.113*** -0.0121 10.7% -0.101*** 89.3% 2912 
 (0.0233) (0.0162) (0.0284) (0.0157)  (0.0297)   
SOEs-UCEs 2.081*** 1.946*** 0.135** 0.0496* 36.7% 0.0854 63.3% 1233 
 (0.0233) (0.0394) (0.0458) (0.0235)  (0.0461)   
SOEs-PIEs 2.081*** 1.846*** 0.235*** 0.140*** 59.6% 0.0955** 40.4% 2600 
 (0.0233) (0.0191) (0.0301) (0.0237)  (0.0349)   
SOEs-FIEs 2.081*** 2.312*** -0.231*** -0.0976** 42.3% -0.134* 57.7% 1120 
 (0.0233) (0.0532) (0.0581) (0.0333)  (0.0598)   
GAIs-UCEs 2.194*** 1.946*** 0.248*** 0.125*** 50.4% 0.123** 49.6% 2249 
 (0.0162) (0.0394) (0.0426) (0.0223)  (0.0398)   
GAIs-PIEs 2.194*** 1.846*** 0.348*** 0.232*** 66.7% 0.116*** 33.3% 3616 
 (0.0162) (0.0191) (0.0250) (0.0162)  (0.0244)   
GAIs-FIEs 2.194*** 2.312*** -0.118* -0.00764 6.5% -0.111* 93.5% 2136 
 (0.0162) (0.0532) (0.0556) (0.0308)  (0.0494)   
UCEs-PIEs 1.946*** 1.846*** 0.100* 0.0886*** 88.6% 0.0114 11.4% 1937 
 (0.0394) (0.0191) (0.0438) (0.0229)  (0.0406)   
UCEs-FIEs 1.946*** 2.312*** -0.366*** -0.180*** 49.2% -0.186** 50.8% 457 
 (0.0394) (0.0532) (0.0663) (0.0414)  (0.0647)   
PIEs-FIEs 1.846*** 2.312*** -0.466*** -0.254*** 54.5% -0.212*** 45.5% 1824 
 (0.0191) (0.0532) (0.0565) (0.0319)  (0.0528)   
Source: See Table 9.2. 
Notes: See Table 9.2. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001. 
Decompositions based on regression results are presented in Tables 9.4 and 9.5. Earnings are 
deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz 
(2006), and updated for 2007. Base: Nationwide prices in 2002. 
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Figure 9.1 Average Annual Real Wage Trend for Public and Private Sectors, 1995-2007 
 
 
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total
SOEs
UCEs
Others
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008). 
Note: In the national statistics, wages refer to the “total remuneration for labor paid by all 
organizations directly to all staff and workers of those entities.” The reported classifications 
by ownership do not distinguish foreign-invested enterprises and private enterprises, which 
are both included in the category “others.” Average annual wages of staff and workers are 
deflated by the urban consumer price index (1995=100).  
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Figure 9.2 Kernel Density Estimations for the Distribution of Income by Ownership Category, 
2002 and 2007 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2002 and 2007 CHIP survey data. 
Note: See Table 9.2. Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price 
deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006), and updated for 2007. Base: Nationwide 
prices in 2002. 
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Figure 9.3 Juhn-Murphy-Pierce Decomposition of Log Hourly Wages by Ownership 
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JMP decomposition - GAIs vs  PIEs, 2002
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JMP decomposition - SOEs vs  GAIs, 2007
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1 Although the sampling design for both surveys was based on that of the annual urban 
household survey conducted by the NBS, there is one discrepancy between the two datasets 
that should be noted. Indeed, the 2007 CHIP data were collected from a new NBS sample. 
The sampled households, which joined the survey in 2008, unlike the households in the 2002 
survey that had recorded income, reported their income by recalling. According to the NBS, 
recalled income might be less accurate than recorded income. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to provide robustness checks for this, but we believe that given the scope of the identified 
effects in our analysis, the bias, if any, should not be too strong. 
 
2 Urban residents are people who live in cities and who hold an urban household registration 
(hukou). Unregistered urban workers such as rural migrants are not included in this dataset. 
 
3 After restricting the sample to full-time employment, the minimum age of the sample 
increased to 18. One may argue that with the expansion of higher education, most individuals 
between the ages of 18 and 22 are still in school, therefore possibly resulting in a bias in the 
sample selection. However, in the 2007 CHIP the percentage of individuals between the ages 
of 18 and 22 who were still in school only accounted for 3.6 percent of this age group, and the 
percentage was even lower in 2002. Hence, such a bias, if any, should not seriously affect our 
estimation results. 
 
4 In 2002, the average education level of workers in GAIs was more than twelve years, much 
higher than that in any other type of enterprise. 
 
5 Interestingly, this is a complete reversal compared to the 1995-2002 period (see Démurger 
et al. 2006). 
 
6 One should note, however, that reported earnings may not fully reflect individuals’ actual 
income in the state sector and may result in an underestimation of earnings. Indeed, the 
welfare system in the SOEs and GAIs is still much better than that in the FIEs and PIEs, but it 
is difficult to collect complete information on this, especially with respect to non-pecuniary 
welfare. Given the comparatively high wages in these two sectors, plus the non-observable 
income, jobs in SOEs and GAIs can still be as attractive as, or even more attractive than, jobs 
in FIEs. 
 
7 This trend confirms the more unequal distribution of hourly wages in the private sector as 
compared to the public sector that was observed in the 1990s (see Chen, Démurger, and 
Fournier 2005; Xing 2008). 
 
8 Non-parametric kernel density estimation is a way to estimate the probability density 
function of a random variable. In our case, the variable of interest is the logarithm of hourly 
earnings. 
 
9 This may reflect our ownership classifications. Indeed, FIEs only include foreign-owned 
and foreign-controlled enterprises, which are mainly concentrated in the higher-end 
industries. 
 
10 Card (1999) provides a brief introduction to all kinds of estimation methods and their 
respective advantages and disadvantages in terms of returns to education. He suggests that the 
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OLS estimation method is the most robust technique. 
 
11 The actual work experience is not reported in the 2007 survey. As a consequence, we use 
the potential work experience, defined as age minus number of years in school minus six. 
 
12 In the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the reference wage structure is estimated from a 
pooled model over the entire sample. The reference residual distribution is the average 
distribution over both samples. The decomposition results presented here are generated using 
the jmpierce.ado program for Stata.  
